Flight Recovery of MAVs with Compromised IMU by Tu, Zhan et al.
Flight Recovery of MAVs with Compromised IMU
Zhan Tu+, Fan Fei+, Matthew Eagon+, Dongyan Xu++, and Xinyan Deng+
Abstract—Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) rely on onboard
attitude and position sensors for autonomous flight. Due to
their size, weight, and power (SWaP) constraints, most modern
MAVs use miniaturized inertial measurement units (IMUs) to
provide attitude feedback, which is critical for flight stabiliza-
tion and control. However, recent adversarial attack studies have
demonstrated that many commonly used IMUs are vulnerable
to attacks exploiting their physical characteristics. Conventional
redundancy-based approaches are not effective against such
attacks because redundant IMUs have the same or similar
physical vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a novel
fault-tolerant solution for IMU compromised scenarios, using
separate position and heading information to restore the failed
attitude states. Rather than adding more IMU alternatives
for recovery, the proposed method is intended to minimize
any modifications to the existing system and control program.
Thus, it is particularly useful for vehicles that have tight SWaP
constraints while requiring simultaneous high performance and
safety demands. To execute the recovery logic properly, a robust
estimator was designed for fine-grained detection and isolation
of the faulty sensors. The effectiveness of the proposed approach
was validated on a quadcopter MAV through both simulation
and experimental flight tests.
I. Introduction
In recent years, autonomous Micro Aerial Vehicles
(MAVs) equipped with onboard sensors have drawn great
interest and wide usage in many applications such as search
and rescue, surveying and inspection, precision agriculture,
aerial photography, and hobbies [1]–[4]. To achieve 6 degrees
of freedom (3-axis position and 3-axis attitude) controlled
flight, a typical sensory system of MAVs consists of attitude
and position sensors for essential feedback to the flight con-
troller [5], [6]. Thanks to Micro-Electro-Mechanical-Systems
(MEMS) technology, most modern MAVs use MEMS-based
inertial measurement units (IMUs) for attitude sensing, which
accommodates the size, weight, and power (SWaP) con-
straints in such vehicle design and manufacturing [5]. IMUs
can support more than just attitude sensing and vehicle
control. The many parameter measurements of these IMUs,
including 3-axis vehicle body accelerations, 3-axis body
angular velocities, and sometimes 3-axis magnetic field, have
also been used to compensate for errors or failures in position
sensing to enhance system robustness [7], [8]. From a flight
safety and system security standpoint, such heavy reliance
on the IMU provides a clear target for adversarial attacks
[9]–[12]. In fact, adversarial attack methodologies targeting
MAV IMUs are evolving rapidly.
To date, attacks targeted at IMUs are not limited to
traditional hacking in the cyber domain [9], [10], but are
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progressively utilizing sensors’ physical vulnerabilities to
construct more effective and stealthy attacks [11], [12]. As
presented in [11], Son et al. have successfully disrupted
the operation of drones using acoustic noise of tailored
frequencies to trigger IMUs to resonate, causing sensor
failure. Trippel et al. have manipulated the IMU readings
with a similar approach and demonstrated the potential to
take complete control of the vehicle and misguide it [12].
These state-of-the-art attacks cause sensor faults and provide
a challenge for the two major aspects of current sensor fault-
tolerant design: fault detection and isolation (FDI), and fault
recovery (FR).
Regarding FDI, the interest of past research has been to
detect anomalies in vehicle states [13]–[15], which is not
generally equivalent to specifying the physical level sensor
failure. For MAVs, different sensor faults/attacks may induce
similar flight state irregularities, e.g., attitude twitching can
originate from either a compromised IMU or a flawed
position sensor. This ambiguity complicates pinpointing the
failure source and may mislead previous state-based FDI
methods to carry out incorrect isolation in some sensor-
failure scenarios of interest. Recently, the in-depth studies
have considered FDI of sensor hardware by diagnosing the
drift and abnormal noise of the sensor readings [16]–[18].
These signal processing-based approaches typically require
a certain model of the sensor measurements, such as corre-
lation function or frequency spectrum, to aid in estimation
and fault detection. It is difficult for such methods to cover
arbitrary flight conditions and scenarios.
For FR, redundancy was previously considered an ade-
quate strategy to handle sensor spoofing. However, redun-
dant sensors are not sufficient when the vehicle encounters
some attacks against the general physical vulnerabilities of
MEMS IMUs since redundant inertial sensors would be
subject to the same detrimental effects of resonating from
external excitation. Separate IMUs could each fail with an
acoustic attack exploiting their resonant frequencies. Adding
different types of backup sensors with significantly different
physical characteristics could be another potential solution to
this problem [19]–[22]. However, considering MAVs’ SWaP
constraints and the usage restrictions of the added sensors,
such as the light condition for visual sensors, implementing
these alternatives may still show limited performance.
To address these issues, we propose a fault-tolerant solu-
tion for MAVs equipped with inertial and position sensors
with no redundancy. In the case of inertial sensor failure,
the proposed solution uses the remaining position and head-
ing information to restore the compromised attitude states.
This method is designed as a two-step scheme, i.e., first
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running a fine-grained IMU FDI design and isolating the
compromised sensors, then triggering a FR logic to function
without IMU feedback accordingly. With such a design,
the system robustness can be enhanced without re-designing
the control program and hardware. Particularly, in the FDI
module, we adopt a smooth variable structure filter (SVSF)
[23] for state estimation. More critically, in the estimation
process, we utilize the chattering signal from the estimated
physical parameters (mass and inertia) of the vehicle to
pinpoint the IMU faults/attacks when the traditional model-
based FDI is invalid [11], [13]–[15], [17], [18]. This method
goes deep into the sensor hardware fault detection without
requiring additional modeling work. For FR, we present a
geometrical approach that makes full use of the remaining
sensors’ information to reconstruct the lost attitude states.
This method is particularly useful for vehicles with stringent
SWaP constraints and has the potential to be used in conjunc-
tion with other fault-tolerant methods. With our approach,
whether the fault came about from malicious attack or some
other source, the functionality of the FDI and FR are not
affected, namely, ‘fault’ can generally be interchanged with
malicious ‘attack’ in many cases.
In this work, we first introduce the physical test platform
in section.II. The sensor FDI and FR methods are then
described in detail in section.III and section.IV, respectively.
Finally, in section.V, the effectiveness of the proposed ap-
proach is validated through both simulation and experimental
flight tests using a quadcopter MAV as shown.
II. Test Platform Description
As shown in Fig.1, we use a quadrotor MAV as our test
platform. The vehicle weighs 125 grams and has a 100mm
wheelbase. The onboard system incorporates four motor
drivers, an STM32 microcontroller with ARM-CortexM4
core, an MPU-6050 IMU that consists of a 3-axis gyroscope
and accelerometer, and an extended compass HMC5883L
for heading direction sensing. Position feedback is pro-
vided by an external motion capture system: VICON system
(www.vicon.com). The entire setup constructs a typical MAV
sensory system, wherein the position and attitude feedback
come from different sensors, with different communication
channels, and different signal frequencies corresponding to
the relevant system bandwidth. These discrepancies are de-
tailed in Table.I. The roll, pitch, and yaw are of the vehicle
are outputs derived using values from all of the sensors in
the IMU. Such sensor fusion lowers the uncertainty of the
measured values of these parameters.
TABLE I
Details of onboard Sensors.
Feedback Sensor Communication Frequencies
Üxb, Üyb, Üzb IMU (Accelerometer) I2C 1000Hz
p, q, r IMU (Gyroscope) I2C 1000Hz
φ, θ IMU (Sensor fusion) I2C 400Hz
ψ Compass+IMU (Sensor fusion) SPI 100Hz
x, y, z VICON Serial 50Hz
zb
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Fig. 1. Test platform coordinate definition. In this work, a small-sized
racing drone is chosen as the test platform. d denotes the distances from
the motor to the center of mass.
The coordinates definition of the vehicle and inertial frame
is shown in Fig.1. The vehicle dynamics is modeled as
ÛP = V, m ÜP = R f b + mg,
ÛR = R[ωb×], J Ûωb = τb − ωb × Jωb .
(1)
where P = [x, y, z]T is the position vector of the vehicle in
the inertial frame XYZ which is defined by North-East-Up
(NEU); V = [ Ûx, Ûy, Ûz]T is the velocity vector of the vehicle;
m is the total mass of the vehicle; g = [0, 0,−g]T is the
gravitational acceleration vector; R is the rotation matrix; J
is the inertia matrix of the vehicle; define a generic symbol
’•’; [•×] denotes the skew-symmetric matrix mapping from
vector dot product to vector cross product; •b represents the
vector in the body frame xbybzb , e.g., the thrust vector f b =
[0, 0, fz]T , the vehicle angular velocity ωb = [p, q, r]T , and
the 3-axis torque vector τb = [τx, τy, τz]T .
III. Faulty Sensor Detection and Isolation
Accurately pinpointing the flawed sensors is critical to exe-
cute the fault recovery logic correctly and ensure flight safety.
In this section, we present a novel design for fine-grained
sensor FDI. By monitoring the variations of the physical
parameters of the vehicle, e.g., mass and 3-axis moment of
inertia, the proposed method can explicitly identify the faulty
sensors in some scenarios that the traditional model-based
methods cannot. The proposed FDI approach is validated as
shown in section.V.
A. State Estimation and Residual Calculation
We first implemented an SVSF as a baseline estimator
to allow state residual checking, using it as a conventional
approach of state anomalies detection [13]–[15]. The effec-
tiveness of this method has already been demonstrated in
our previous studies [24]. Such a preliminary result shows
the robustness of this method under the bounded modeling
uncertainties and disturbances. However, [24] focused on en-
suring the security of the vehicle controller using a redundant
approach. In this work, the FDI focuses on identifying and
responding to sensor physical faults.
The typical SVSF estimator consists of two stages: pre-
diction and correction. In one iteration, a model-based pre-
diction function Fˆ generates a priori state estimation xˆk |k−1
first. A discrete corrective action is then taken by adding
a corrective gain Kk . The corrective gain is used to both
guarantee the stability of the estimator and also rectify
the bounded estimation error. Subsequently, the updated
posteriori estimation xˆk |k and state measurement zk |k carry
out the next iteration. In order to implement SVSF properly,
we rewrite the nonlinear MAV model to a discrete form [24]
xk+1 = F (xk, uk, d˜k ),
zk+1 = Hxk + n˜k,
(2)
where the vehicle states are given by x = [P,V,Θ,ωb]T ,
wherein Θ = [φ, θ, ψ]T represents vehicle’s 3-axis Eular
angle; k is the time step; the vector u = [u1, u2, u3, u4]T
denote the system input which is the input voltages of the
four motors; d˜ is the external disturbance; z is the state
measurement; H = I12 where I12 is a twelfth-order identity
matrix; n˜ is the measurement noise.
Following the above discrete model, a prediction function
Fˆ can be defined accordingly.
With Fˆ , the prediction stage can be expressed by
xˆk |k−1 = Fˆ (xˆk−1 |k−1, uk−1),
ek |k−1 = zk − Hˆ xˆk |k−1.
(3)
where •ˆ denotes the corresponding estimation variable. The
estimation result is defined by zˆk = Hˆ xˆk .
The correction stage is given by
Kk = Hˆ
−1
k (|ek |k−1 | + γ |ek−1 |k−1 |) ◦ sgn(ek |k−1),
xˆk |k = xˆk |k−1 + Kk,
ek |k = zk − Hˆk xˆk |k .
(4)
The stability proof of the estimator is similar to that in
[23] with the different state variables.
When the vehicle is subject to sensor failure, the incor-
rect feedback can induce discrepancies between estimation
result and actual sensor readings, generating non-negligible
residual variations:
r =
k+N∑
i=k
(zi − zˆi)(zi − zˆi)T , (5)
where r is the residual vector dedicated to each state; 1/N
is the updating frequency.
For FDI, if the residual rises beyond a certain threshold,
a fault/attack is presumably present and will be reported,
consequently starting the execution of isolation logic. Such
thresholds can be determined by the system physical band-
width and control input constraints. Experimentally acquisi-
tion of sensor readings under the critical stable flight also
can guide the threshold selection.
B. Fine-grained Sensor FDI
Detecting abnormalities in the system states relies solely
on the interpretation of the residual, which can expose the
presence of the fault/attack but cannot explicitly pinpoint its
specific source in hardware. This is mainly because some
of the state parameters cannot be measured directly, such as
attitude information, i.e., roll, pitch, and yaw angles. Instead,
they are usually updated through a sensor fusion algorithm
that combines the feedback from multiple sensors in a certain
sampling frequency. This synthesis of sensor feedback is
moderately beneficial in that it takes advantages from each
individual sensor’s unique characteristics. Such a comple-
mentary effect reduce sensor error and noise significantly.
However, it also weakens the impact of any single sensor and
mitigates the impact of the sensing faults to some degree due
to the coupled vehicle dynamics. This general issue limits the
efficiency and accuracy of typical model-based FDI methods
as they highly rely on sensor fusion results, which motivates
us to improve the current design. In this subsection, we will
propose to use the variations of physical parameters of the
vehicle (mass/inertia) to address this problem.
Since the physical parameters of the vehicle are usually
not changed significantly during the real flight, if a sensor
fault/attack appears, we can track the unexpectedly varying
model parameters in reverse and trace the source of the vari-
ations to the specific faulty components. For our estimator,
due to the zero-width smoothing layer in Kk , the modeling
error is referred to as a chattering signal.
The a priori chattering of Ch = [CH Ûz,CHp,CHq,CHr ]T
is defined as
Chk |k−1 = dt

∆(CLm )
(Cψk−1Cφk−1) fz
∆(J1)qk−1rk−1 + ∆(CLJx )
τx
∆(J2)pk−1rk−1 + ∆(CLJy )
τy
∆(J3)pk−1qk−1 + ∆(CDJz )
τz

, (6)
where C• and S• denote cos(•) and sin(•) respectively for
compact notation; Jx, Jy, Jz,m are the moment of inertias and
mass of the vehicle; J1 =
Jy−Jz
Jx
, J2 = Jx−JzJy , J3 =
Jx−Jy
Jz
.
From the above formulation, such a priori chattering is
caused by the magnitude of the model uncertainties and can
be used to point out the source and magnitude of modeling
error [23]. In contrary, if the vehicle model is trusted, it
infers related sensing/actuation flaws accordingly. Therefore,
it can be utilized to pinpoint the faulty components of the
vehicle. In normal flights, the chattering is bounded and can
be used to refined model parameters through a short time
on-line calibration. The calibrated model contains a set of
meaningful physical parameters relevant to the inception of
the IMU working status in the MAV system. Specifically,
the IMU fault/attack causes additional forces and torques
output, yielding a substantial transient error in the estimation
of the corresponding physical parameters. This error can then
be employed to pinpoint the compromised IMU sensor as
its measurements are directly related to these parameters.
On the other hand, for underactuated MAVs like quadrotors,
because the position measurements are largely independent
of the physical parameters being estimated, position sensor
spoofing will only cause r and corresponding e terms to
change, showing minor effects on Ch. The effectiveness
Fig. 2. Geometric principles of attitude feedback recover when the inertial sensor has been isolated. The rotations along Z-Y-X axes can be derived using
the changes in the relative Cartesian axis vectors respectively as shown.
of using chattering signal for IMU failure identification is
demonstrated in section.V.
IV. Flight Recovery
The vulnerabilities of MAVs’ onboard sensors are differ-
ent: inertial components are sensitive to vibrations; magnetic
components cannot be resistant to magnetic field distortion;
position sensing is usually derived from external references
(satellites, landmarks or cameras), relying on communication
quality. Because of these differences, for adversaries, it is
almost impossible to develop a coordinated attack that covers
all sensors [25]. This fact gave us the confidence to use the
trusted sensors that have not been isolated to complement and
accommodate the faults of the others. This complementary
approach does not require hardware redundancy, which fits
those small sized aerial vehicles that have SWaP constraints.
In this section, we present our complementary method for
IMU fault/attack recovery. In particular, due to the geometric
correlations of the vehicle dynamics, position feedback can
be used to provide an alternative attitude approximation for
flight control. During the recovery process, following the
fine-grained FDI, the compromised IMU readings will be
totally rejected. The recovery logic instead uses the rest of
unattacked sensors for attitude estimation. The successful
recovery shown in section.V validates the performance of
the proposed FR method.
For MAVs, if the IMU faults are detected and isolated,
besides the absolute yaw angle measured by compass, most
of the body frame information becomes unreachable. It is a
severe fault as the vehicle is certain to lose attitude stability.
To ensure flight safety, our geometric approach associates
attitude with such limited remaining feedback, i.e., x, y, z, ψ
to approximate the current attitude and allow control.
Inspired by the MAV geometric control [26], the essence
of MAV attitude generation is the direction change of the
thrust vector. Since the thrust vector is always perpendicular
to the rotor-disk plane on rotary-winged vehicles, it deter-
mines the roll and pitch attitude specifically. Based on this
phenomenon, we can use the following geometrical approach
for attitude recovery.
From equation.(1), in the inertial frame T = m ÜP − mg. It
is normalized as t =
T
|T | = [t1, t2, t3]
T for later calculation.
We ignored the small body damping here for our test
platform. The heading direction of the vehicle defines the
first coordinate transformation R¯1 as shown in Fig.2,
R¯1 =

Cψ Sψ 0
−Sψ Cψ 0
0 0 1
 , (7)
where ψ ∈ (0, 2pi).
Through R¯1 rotation, the original north-east-up coordinate
XYZ is transferred to an auxiliary coordinate X1Y1Z1. Then,
the vehicle tilting angles along the pitch and roll direction
are determined by R¯2 and R¯3, respectively:
R¯2 =

Cθ¯ 0 Sθ¯
0 1 0
−Sθ¯ 0 Cθ¯

=

Z1 · Z2 0 Y1 · (Z1 × Z2)
0 1 0
−Y1 · (Z1 × Z2) 0 Z1 · Z2
 ,
R¯3 =

1 0 0
0 Cφ¯ −Sφ¯
0 Sφ¯ Cφ¯

=

1 0 0
0 Z2 · t −X2 · (Z2 × t)
0 X2 · (Z2 × t) Z2 · t
 .
(8)
Through rotation R¯2 and R¯3, the coordinate transformation
follows the sequence of X1Y1Z1 → X2Y2Z2 → X3Y3Z3,
wherein X3Y3Z3 is the current body frame coordinate. The
corresponding θ¯ and φ¯ in R¯2 and R¯3 provide attitude
feedback which is generated based on position and heading
feedback in the inertial frame. In normal conditions, both
θ¯, φ¯ ∈ (−pi
2
,
pi
2
).
With ψ and t, we know X1 = [Cψ, Sψ, 0]T and t =
[t1, t2, t3]T . The unknown terms in R¯2 and R¯3 matrices are

Cθ¯ = Z1 · Z2 = t × Y1| t × Y1 | =
t3
λ(t, ψ)
Sθ¯ = Y1 · (Z1 × Z2) = t × X1|Y1 × t | =
t1Cψ + t2Sψ
λ(t, ψ)
Cφ¯ = Z2 · t = λ(t, ψ)
Sφ¯ = −X2 · (Z2 × t) = Y2 · t = −t1Sψ + t2Cψ
, (9)
where λ(t, ψ) =
√
t23 + (t1Cψ + t2Sψ)2.
From equation.(9), the complimentary attitude feedback
φ¯, θ¯ can be calculated mathematically using inverse trigono-
metric functions arccos(•) and arcsin(•).
By taking advantage of the fact that the pose of the vehicle
determines the thrust orientation, the proposed method above
is able to recover attitude control with limited sensor read-
ings. The proposed method can also be generalized to any
sensor that can provide the thrust vector measurement, such
as visual, acoustic, and laser sensors. For implementation,
if the frequency of the recovered feedback is insufficient for
control, gain tuning or digital control is required.
V. Simulation and Experimental Results
For the purpose of validation, we deployed our method
onto a customized simulation tool [27], which was used to
solve the nonlinear dynamics of the vehicle. The physical pa-
rameters of the vehicle used in the simulation were obtained
by conducting system identification on the test platform. Each
component of such platform has been measured, weighted,
and modeled in CAD software, and mass/inertia parameters
are calculated accordingly. In the simulation, we verified
the proposed FDI and FR. Then, we experimentally demon-
strated run-time attitude recovery with a compromised IMU,
which is still considered challenging for most of the current
fault-tolerant schemes for MAVs [13]–[18]. The transmission
delay will affect the FR performance. In our setup, it is about
0.025s which slows down the effective control frequency and
causes control error.
A. Simulation Validations
1) FDI Validation: In this test, the VICON and IMU
readings were attacked individually to show the effectiveness
of the proposed FDI design in pinpointing the compromised
sensor under similar abnormal MAV behaviors. In particular,
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Fig. 3. Feasibility of the proposed FDI design under different sensor attacks
is shown in this figure. To demonstrate, we added additive bias onto VICON
and gyroscope readings which are tuned to achieve similar flight patterns
(position and attitude) as shown in (a) and (b). The corresponding state
estimation errors that dominate the residual and chattering information are
shown in (c) and (d), respectively.
the x-position feedback and the corresponding axis’ gyro-
scope reading were attacked. For flight control, a position-
attitude cascade PD controller was used. As shown in Fig.3
(a-b), these two different types of sensor attack generated
close flight paths and attitude responses. Such a scenario
provides a challenge to differentiate those attacks. For FDI,
we first use SVSF as a traditional state estimator to generate
residual of the related vehicle states. Such a residual can
detect anomalies. However, it cannot pinpoint the exact faulty
sensor as the state estimation errors of these two scenarios
are also pretty close as shown in Fig.3 (c), which yields
indistinguishable residual accordingly. As an underactuated
system, such MAV’s coupled dynamics induces the multiple
flight states to change from tampering with single feedback.
Thus, just checking residual usually cannot explicitly deter-
mine the compromised parts, potentially causing incorrect
isolation. To improve the FDI accuracy, we propose using
the chattering signals CHq to provide an effective way to
identify the specific compromised sensor.
Chattering signals, rendered by physical model variations,
offer a clear solution to address this problem since the
vehicles’ physical parameters (mass and inertia) usually do
not change significantly during the flight. As shown in Fig.3
(d), because tampering with gyroscope measurements cause
the body inertia estimation to diverge while position spoofing
does not, the chattering signal appears more sensitive when
the IMU is faulty than that the position sensor is. Conse-
quently, gyroscope attacks can be identified explicitly and
reliably by the significant fluctuations in chattering signal,
differentiating from position sensor attack scenario. Here,
±0.06 (grey lines) is chosen as the threshold to detect
gyroscope abnormalities.
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Fig. 4. (a) shows the effects of IMU feedback being fully isolated in hover
flight without FR function: as the attack triggered, the attitude feedback is
totally diverging. Without such available feedback, the vehicle lost its flight
stability immediately. In test (b), the proposed FR algorithm has turned on.
With FR, the vehicle can maintain its stability without IMU. Such attacks
induced oscillated IMU readings, which causes inaccurate sensor fusion
result. Ground truth is from VICON records with an inevitable delay. Due
to the relatively low update frequency of the restored attitude feedback,
position and attitude control shows errors but remains in a certain bound.
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Fig. 5. (a) shows the IMU attack without FR. From left to right, the composed time sequential result, the tricked IMU readings like [11], the attitude
response, and flight trajectory are shown respectively. These severely oscillated IMU signals affect attitude stabilization significantly, the vehicle crashing
immediately about 0.2 seconds. Here, only gyro’s raw data is plotted for the demonstration of IMU attack, though the not shown accelerometer measurements
were compromised simultaneously. (b) shows the IMU attack with FR. With FR, since the compromised IMU readings has been totally rejected, the attitude
stability of the vehicle has ensured by the complementary feedback accordingly. The pink area indicates that FDI detected an IMU attack and the
corresponding sensor readings had been isolated.
2) FR Validation: This test assesses the effectiveness of
the proposed method of attitude feedback recovery and re-
stabilization of the vehicle. The prerequisite of the execu-
tion of FR is that the proposed FDI module detects the
corresponding IMU faults. The control law is the same as
the last test. When an IMU attack is generated, the default
attitude sensing (sensor fusion result) is totally divergent.
FDI detected anomalies and isolated IMU measurements
accordingly such that feedback from the IMU (particularly,
measurements of accelerometer and gyroscope) is completely
rejected and the vehicle drops immediately without any
replacement feedback as shown in Fig.4.(a). In comparison,
utilizing the recovery logic with the remaining compass sen-
sor for attitude estimation, the vehicle was able to maintain its
attitude stabilization and stay within a bounded area (a 0.2m
circular around area for 16 seconds in this test). While the
position tracking of the vehicle is not ideal due to the lower
feedback frequency inherent with this method, it achieves
safe flight as demonstrated in Fig.4.(b).
B. Experimental Results and Discussion
This experiment aims to counter the severe oscillations
in IMU measurements, which is a significantly threatening
attack for MAVs as presented in [11] since traditional fault-
tolerant strategies become ineffective under such attacks
though they have shown high reliability in many other tasks
[13]–[15], [24]. A PD control law is adopted for position
tracking and attitude stabilization as it was used in the
simulation. For demonstration, we replicate the sensor failure
pattern presented in [11] by maliciously aliasing a high-
low-frequency signal on the IMU sensor via trojan input
to mimic its resonating output as shown in Fig.5. Under
such attack, the compromised IMU needs to be isolated
immediately. Then, the position information could be used to
provide alternative attitude feedback to stabilize the vehicle.
During the experiment, we first triggered the fault without
a fault-tolerant scheme: the vehicle lost stability immedi-
ately as shown in Fig.5. In contrast, utilizing the proposed
FDI and FR, the MAV demonstrated stable hovering flight
with the compromised IMU. From the experiment results
shown in Fig.5, the vehicle can maintain its stability for
sustained flight. Compared to simulated flight, the onboard
implementation required less precise lightweight sensors and
processors leading to slightly larger numerical error and
subsequent position drift in the experimental test, but it
still provided enough time for a safe landing or other safe
reactions. It is worth noting that the position information
used to make the necessary attitude feedback estimates was
updated with higher accuracy and frequency than common
GPS systems provide. To date, GPS systems with update
frequencies of 50 Hz and above are commercially available.
VI. Conclusion
In this work, a fault-tolerant design is proposed for MAVs
against IMU compromised scenarios. The proposed design
included two main parts: FDI and FR. FDI was performed,
which took into account the vehicle states and modeling
uncertainties to accurately determine the faulty sensors and
execute isolation of compromised feedback. Afterward, for
flight recovery with incomplete feedback, we proposed a
geometrical method that relies on the remaining position and
heading information to estimate attitude feedback needed to
support flight control, without control program modification.
The proposed MAV sensor fault-tolerant design has been
validated through both simulation and experimental tests
using a small-sized quadcopter platform. The results show
that this novel design can successfully detect and respond
to compromised IMUs, allowing the vehicle to recover sta-
bilized flight without IMU readings. Though there is some
loss of position control, i.e., the position drifts over time,
the more critical attitude control is maintained allowing the
vehicle to avoid an otherwise imminent crash. The future
work following this effort could be porting this fault-tolerant
design to other different types of MAVs, e.g., fixed-wing or
flapping-wing MAVs, and incorporating it with other fault-
tolerant methodologies.
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